THE PECULIAR ROLE OF THE DELAWARE COURTS IN T H E COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS

Jill E. Fisch·
More large publicly-traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware than in any other state. 1 Since the early 1900s, Delaware has been the dominant choice as state of incorporation for the largest U.S. companies.
2 Almost half the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and nearly 60% of Fortune 500 companies have chosen to incorporate in Delaware. 3 This success in attracting corporate charters has been profitable; incorporations bring Delaware approximately $440 million per year in franchise taxes and related fees. 4 Scholars continually attempt to explain Delaware's success. 5 Reasoning that the choice of a state of incorporation involves the selection of a body of corporate law, they posit that the incorporation statistics reflect a preference for Delaware law. Although there is disagreement in the academic community as to whether this process leads to the selection of a value-maximizing body of corporate law or one that permits management self-dealing at the expense of shareholders or other corporate constituencies, scholars agree that the process is appropriately characterized as regulatory competition. 6 States compete for corporate charters by offering variations in corporate law. Whether l 062 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TIIA W REVIEW [Vol. 68 the competition is described as a race to the bottom or a race to the top, Delaware emerges as the undisputed winner.
Several factors, however, weaken the explanatory power of the regulatory competition model. First, variations in state corporation laws are minimal. 7 If there are few substantive differences between Delaware law and that of other states, it is difficult to understand the incorporation decision as reflecting a preference for Delaware law. Second, empirical analysis fails to demonstrate the superiority or inferiority ofDelaware's substantive law. For example, studies indicate that state antitakeover statutes reduce shareholder value.
8 A race to the top theory would therefore predict that Delaware would not adopt an anti takeover statute; a race to the bottom theory would predict the adoption of a strong antitakeover statute. In fact, Delaware has opted for a middle ground and adopted a moderate antitakeover statute that is not adequately explained by either theory. Third, Delaware's advantage in attracting charters seems immune from competition. Despite efforts to enter the race, other states appear to be unable to compete. 9 Indeed closer examination reveals regulatory competition to be essentially a two horse race. Corporations choose between incorporating in their home state and incorporating in Delaware.
10 Virtually no corporation chooses any other alternative.
Importantly, choosing to incorporate in Delaware is not costless. Delaware's franchise fees for large corporations are significantly higher than those imposed by any other state. The largest corporations pay $150,000 a year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware.
11
Although these fees may not be financially material for a Fortune 500 company, Delaware's continued ability to impose fees substantially in excess of those charged by other states suggests that Delaware incorporation offers nontrivial value.
12 In other words, it suggests that the corporate preference for Delaware is real.
As a result, scholars have continued their efforts to explain this preference by looking beyond substantive difierences in Delaware l 064
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presents a puzzle to those who seek to explain the dominance of Delaware incorporation.
This article offers a solution to the puzzle and an alternative explanation for Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters-the unique lawmaking function of the Delaware courts. The article focuses on the peculiar role of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking, a role that has received little attention from corporate law scholars. The article demonstrates that Delaware uses an unusual process to make corporate law. Delaware relies heavily on judge-made law, but the structure and operation of the Delaware courts causes Delaware's judicial lawmaking to differ from that in other states. Indeed, the process by which Delaware courts make corporate law resembles legislation in some ways.
23
The article then evaluates this lawmaking structure from a standpoint of comparative institutional advantage. In particular, the article compares Delaware's process to the political process. The article concludes that Delaware lawmaking offers Delaware corporations a variety of benefits, including flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from undue political influence, and transparency. These benefits increase Delaware's ability to adjust its corporate law to changes in the business world. By identifying the role of the Delaware courts as central to Delaware's dominance of the market for corporate charters, this article has important implications for the application ofDelaware's success to continuing questions of regulatory design.
I. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND THE CARY-WINTER DEBATE
Analysis of regulatory competition in corporate law begins with the classic Cary-Winter debate. In 1974, William Cary published a seminal article identifying Delaware's leadership status as a corporate domicile. 24 Cary analyzed Delaware's success and concluded that, because of its substantial reliance on corporate franchise taxes, Delaware deliberately sought to attract corporate charters. Moreover, because the choice of state of incorporation is made by management, Cary posited that Delaware structured its corporation law to appeal to corporate management. According to Cary, the result was lax legal standards that favored management interests over those of shareholders. Cary termed 23 . Set, e.g.,Jill E. Fisch, RetroactiuiJy and ugal Cfumgt: An Equilibrium Approach, II 0 HARV. L. REv.
I OSS, 1107 ·8 ( 1997) (developing description of traditional process of judicial lawmaking and contrasting that process with adjudication that closely resembles legislative lawmaking).
24. See Cary, supra note 9.
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the competition a "race to the bottom" and recommended federal minimum standards to stop the race.
25
Cary's conclusions were challenged, most famously by Judge Ralph Winter. 26 \Vhile agreeing with Cary's observation of regulatory competition in corporate law, vVinter argued that the competition was more accurately described as a "race to the top." Significantly, Winter argued that market constraints preclude managers from sacrificing shareholder interests by choosing a domicile with inferior rules of corporate law. Indeed, the markets within which firms operate create incentives for managers to choose the corporate law that maximizes firm value.
Corporate law scholars have aligned themselves with Cary or vVinter and expanded on the analysis of regulatory competition. Lucian Bebchuk, for example, agrees ·with Cary that at least some aspects of regulatory competition are value-decreasing. 27 Bebchuk warns t..~at state competition is unlikely to produce efficient rules governing "issues that are 'significantly redistributive';" issues that directly affect the strength of the market, particularly takeover regulation; and issues that implicate the interests of third parties.
28 Accordingly Bebchuk argues that Cary correctly concludes that state competition will, in some cases, cause states to provide legal rules that favor manager interests over those of shareholders. In his most recent work, Bebchuk, together with Allen Ferrell, argues that states have produced bad takeover law and suggests that takeover regulation is not an isolated example of the failure of regulatory competition but rather a reason to give greater credence to Cary's analysis. 29 William Bratton andj oseph McCahery offer a similar perspective, describing charter competition as an example of regulatory capture by corporate management and explaining that, as a result of this capture, state competition is unlikely to produce optimal corporate law. 30 Most corporate law scholars, however, align themselves with Winter. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for example, concur in Winter's assessment that market factors are likely to result in corporate law 25 
33
The regulatory competition model has important implications for corporate law. Cary sought to predicate a defense of federal incorporation or, at least, federal minimum standards, on his description of regulatory competition as producing a race to the bottom. 34 Romano, in contrast, uses her defense of state competition to argue against federal regulation oftakeovers. 35 In fact, Romano asserts that the demonstrated success of regulatory competition in corporate law supports adoption of a similar approach to securities regulation in place of the existing system of mandatory national rules.
36
It is difficult, however, to explain Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate charters on the basis of the substantive superiority ofDelaware corporate law, whether substantive superiority is defined as better for shareholders as in vVinter's view, or better for managers, as Cary claimed. For one thing, state corporation statutes contain relatively little substantive variation. Careful empirical research reveals that corporate codes tend toward uniformity.
37
Even though innovations may initially cause statutory differences, the statutes rapidly converge. 38 Although convergence is a predictable result of regulatory In addition, evidence suggests that, although Delaware is successful in attracting charters, its law is not optimal. Cary and Bebchuk have noted a variety of ways in which Delaware law appears to favor management interests at the expense of shareholder interests. 40 Bebchuk's more recent analysis of takeover regulation indicates that Delaware's substantive law of takeovers is particularly problematic, an analysis that is not contradicted by Romano's efforts to defend Delaware law. 41 Romano and other scholars in the Winter camp agree that state antitakeover regulation inefficiently interferes with the market for corporate control, yet these scholars are unable to reconcile this inefficiency with their defense of regulatory competition. 42 If states compete for charters by offering superior products, it is difficult to understand why competition has not addressed the observed problems in Delaware law.
Indeed, if there is a competitive market for corporate charters, why has no state been able to supplant Delaware by offering a superior statute? To the contrary, no state has been able to duplicate Delaware's success at attracting charters. Although other states have attempted to compete by modeling their law after that ofDelaware, they are unable to attract incorporations. 43 Cary and other commentators point to the relatively recent effort by Nevada to become a "Delaware of the West."
44
In addition to adopting the Delaware statute, the Nevada legislature adopted Delaware case law. 45 Moreover, courts construing Nevada law appear to follow Delaware precedent. These observations have led to a refinement of the academic models of regulatory competition. Commentators have replaced the initial attempts to defend Delaware's dominance on the basis of substantive superiority by a broader range of explanations. Roberta Romano, for example, has done extensive work explaining why Delaware, from a transaction cost perspective, has an incentive to compete for corporate charters and is able to maintain its existing advantage in the race.
48
Romano explains that, because Delaware is a small state and is heavily dependent on the revenues it obtains from corporate franchise taxes, it is able to commit to its regulatory structure in a way that is impossible for states that lack similar financial incentives. 
51
This competition need not increase firm value; indeed it may lead to a litigation intensive regulatory structure that sacrifices the interests of the firm and its shareholders in favor of the interests of counsel.
Scholars have expanded on the transaction cost approach and identified a variety of nonsubstantive explanations for Delaware's success. Although a complete analysis of these explanations is beyond the scope of this article, they include the responsiveness of the Delaware legislature and its commitment to updating the Delaware statute, 52 Delaware's specialized and expert judiciary which provides both rapid and high quality litigation decisions, 5 3 network externalities provided by Delaware law, 5 56 Although this amount may seem small relative to the operations of a large public corporation, it is five hundred to one thousand times the amount those firms would pay to incorporate elsewhere. 57 Troubled by the evidence that Delaware can persistently charge what appears to be a noncompetitive price for the privilege ofincorporation, scholars persist in an effort to explain how Delaware incorporation adds value. In terms of transaction costs, the choice of Delaware can be explained if Delaware incorporation reduces the costs ofbusiness operations. The benefits of Delaware incorporation may include such nonsubstantive advantages as better courts or more readily available case law. So long as the benefits outweigh the slightly higher cost of Delaware incorporation, firms will continue to choose Delaware.
The problem with many of the nonsubstantive explanations for Delaware's success is the inability of scholars to tie Delaware's supposed advantages to predictable cost savings for Delaware firms. For example, although a competent and expert judiciary might reduce the cost of litigation, 5 8 Delaware law seems to create an increased risk oflitigation for Delaware firms. 59 The combination of reduced litigation costs but increased incidence oflitigation is likely to have an indeterminate effect on firm value. 60 Scholars also attribute Delaware's success to network externalities, which reduce information and compliance costs. 61 63 In addition, the increased legal costs associated with out-of-state incorporation have been cited as a downside to Delaware incorporation. 64 Moreover, a reduction in attorneys' fees, like the more general reduction in legal costs, would have to be weighed against the greater risk of litigation associated with Delaware incorporation.
Delaware's body of decisional law provides a more general transaction cost explanation for Delaware's success. Commentators argue that, because of the substantial volume ofbusiness litigation in the state, Delaware has built up a store of precedent that serves as an independent and valuable resource for firms subject to Delaware law. 65 Thus Romano explains that Delaware's "well-developed case law with a pool of handy precedent" makes Delaware decisions "more predictable than those of other states." 66 Mel Eisenberg describes Delaware's rich case law as increasing predictability. Extensive and predictable case law reduces the cost of business operations in two ways. A well developed body of precedent makes it cheaper and easier to ascertain the legal consequences associated with business decisions, thereby reducing the information cost of structuring transactions. In addition, clear legal rules reduce the risk of subsequent litigation. Notably, these benefits are independent of the substantive merits of the applicable legal rules. Commentators have observed that, with respect to business transactions, it is often more important that the applicable legal rules be settled than that they be settled correctly. 5 8 As a consequence, the predictability and stability provided by Delaware's extensive body of precedent are described as one of the affirmative advantages ofDelaware incorporation. This article suggests another answer. In the following section, the articl e explores in greater detail the manner in which Delaware produces corporate law. The article demonstrates that Delaware employs an atypical lawmaking process . A substantial portion of Delaware's corporate law is made by the courts, but the Delaware courts make law in a manner traditionally associated with legislative rather than judicial lawmaking. The following section of the article explores the normative implications of this process.
for the law to be se ttled than to be settled correctly"); sec also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (adhering to precedent "is usuall y the wise policy, because in most matters it is mo re important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right"').
69 
II. THE DELAWARE COURTS AS LAWMAKERS
A. The Traditional Lawmal.,'ing Role rf the Courts
In other projects, I have analyzed the lawmaking role of the courts and some of the structural differences between judicial and legislative lawmaking. 73 I have developed what might be described as a model of traditional judicial lawmaking. I argue that traditional judicial lawmaking is generally evolutionary in nature. 74 More specifically, judicial lawmaking is characterized by incremental legal change within the framework of a fixed set of objectives.
75 Unlike legislatures, courts rarely change legal rules as a result of a shift in political power or a rejection of the policies that motivated the adoption of the original rule, preferring to leave those decisions for the legislative process.
Courts are also limited in the scope of the legal change that they can effect due to limitations on control of their agendas. 76 Courts, unlike legislatures, generally cannot initiate legal change but must wait for litigants to commence an action.
77
Courts may also, in some circumstances, be constrained by requirements such as justiciability as to the issues that they can reach.
78
As a consequence of these limitations, adjudicative legal change is more predictable, coherent and, frequently, smaller in magnitude than legislative change.
These characteristics are enhanced by the doctrine of stare decisis which operates to limit the circumstances under which a court may deviate from a previously adopted legal rule. In another pending project, I explain how stare decisis enhances the stability of judicial lawmaking.
79 While a legislature requires no justification to overturn a previously adopted statute or reject a policy objective embraced by its predecessor, a court's disagreement with the wisdom of a previously adopted legal rule is rarely sufficient to justify overruling. Instead, a court that wishes to overturn a precedent must generally demonstrate that the prior legal rule suffers from some sort of substantive or 
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procedural defect.
80
.AJthough a court may seek to escape the consequences of a contrary precedent by distinguishing it, that very act narrows the scope of the court's decision. This distinction between the legislative and judicial processes permits the government to choose greater legal stability by committing particular subject matter to the courts. Thus the doctrine of stare decisis fosters stable legal rules and privileges courts over legislators as creators ofthose rules.
81
Finally, the temporal scope of judicial lawmaking reinforces the traditional judicial role. Judge-made rule changes typically apply retroactively. 82 This operation can be justified on both fairness and efficiency grounds because of the nature of judicial lawmaking.
83 A variety of doctrinal constraints limit the ability of courts to apply new legal rul es in a purely prospective manner. In the federal co urts, for example, prospective adjudication may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause or the constitutional ban on advisory opinions.
84
Forward-looking aspects of judicial opinions may also be characterized as dicta, a characterization that allows subsequent courts to disregard such statements as authoritative rulemaking. 85 These constraints effectively limit the extent to which judicial rulemaking can focus on the regulation of future transactions.
These characteristics of traditional judicial lawmaking increase the stability and predictability of judge-made law relative to legislation. I argue elsewhere that these features may explain the dominance of common law rules in areas such as property and contract law, where stability and predictability are said to reduce transaction costs and facilitate transactions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified the primacy of stability and predictability in these areas as a basis for applying principles that restrain judicial lawmaking to this traditional mode, such as requiring courts to adhere closely to precedent. 
B. Characteristics of Delaware law
Although Delaware's role in the competition for corporate charters is frequently analyzed in terms ofDelaware's corporation statute,judgemade law is at least as, if not more, significant. Despite their statutory source, the majority ofDelaware's important legal rules are the result of judicial decisions. The scope of the business judgment rule, the analysis of transactions that implicate the duty of loyalty, the legal standards governing management's response to a hostile tender offer, all are based on legal principles articulated by the Delaware courts. Lawyers tend to think of corporate law as statutory, but there is a substantial common law component to Delaware corporate law.
From a transactional perspective, the importance of decisional law increases. Although the D elaware statute provides general guidelines about corporate formalities such as the scheduling of annual meetings 87 and the required components of a corporate charter, 88 the statute does not deal with the fiduciary principles that provide the foundation of corporate law and allow, under appropriate circumstances, judicial scrutiny of corporate decisionmaking. As a practical matter, the interpretation and application of these fiduciary principles is the heart of corporate law, yet the Delaware statute provides almost no guidance on the subject. Apart from the provision that relates to interested director transactions, 89 the Delaware statute does not even address the subject of fiduciary duties.
Moreover consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, 92 Delaware has no "other constituency" statute. 93 Other states have codified the business judgment rule; 94 Delaware has left development of the rule to common law. 95 Georgia has a statutory provision addressed to the corporate opportunity doctrine; 96 Delaware relies on precedent. 97 Even the circumstances under which a demand is excused in a shareholder derivative suit are addressed in Delaware by judge-made chancery court rules rather than by statute. 98 The lawmaking by Delaware courts is also distinctive. As noted above, Delaware decisional law is relatively indeterminate. 99 Delaware's judicial lawmaking also has a number of atypical characteristics that cause it to resemble the legislative process. Despite the similarities, Delaware courts do not face the political pressures associated with legislative lawmaking; indeed, for state courts, the Delaware courts enjoy a high degree of political independence.
Recent scholarship has highlighted the indeterminacy of Delaware law. 100 (1999) (describi ng absence of underlying principles in valuation determinations and resulting lack of consistency and predictability in case outcomes). This ambiguity is both inherent in business law and not uniqu e to Delaware. [Vol. 68 standard-based approach. 101 Kamar focuses on cases dealing with fiduciary duties and demonstrates that fact-intensive legal standards dominate the case law. Legal tests that turn on the proportionality of management's response to a perceived threat, that assess the legitimacy of a self-dealing transaction based on whether it meets a test of " entire fairness," and that use reasonableness as a benchmark for evaluating business decisionmaking are standard based. Standards apply general principles that judges must use to evaluate transactions from an ex post perspective . Louis Kaplow explains that standards, in comparison to rules, increase judicial discretion. 102 This discretion, in turn, reduces the ability of decisionmakers to predict the legal consequences of their actions ex ante.
1076
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Del aware courts also apply the relevant legal standards in a fact and case specific manner. 106 Although the outcomes in these decisions can be explained instead on the basis of factual differences, this analysis can only be performed on an ex post basis. 107 As a result, the decisions offer little insight to those who seek predictive power from doctrinal analysis. Kamar 
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that legal standards diverge, the principles adopted by Delaware courts retain the greatest degree of ambiguity. For example, under Delaware law, a court faced with a motion by a special litigation committee to dismiss a derivative suit may, in addition to considering the degree to which the committee was informed and independent, also evaluate whether, in the court's independent business judgment, dismissal is appropriate.
109
The New York courts have rejected the second component of this test, significantly reducing the degree of judicial discretion.
110 Similarly, Delaware's controversial intermediate standard of review in the takeover context is not universally accepted as the appropriate test for evaluating the directors' conduct.
11
Delaware decisional law is also characterized by a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness. Not only are Delaware courts active lawmakers, they are willing to revise previously announced legal doctrines on the theory that a different approach reflects sounder policy. In part, the flexibility ofDelaware case law results from the structure of the Delaware courts. The Delaware chancery courts, which are the trial level courts on corporate issues, are courts of equity. The fact that a specialized trial court is, in Delaware, the primary judicial lawmaker, increases the degree of flexibility in Delaware corporate law. The decision of one chancery court does not bind another, and chancery court decisions are readily overturned by the Delaware Supreme Court even when they appear to have developed workable or predictable legal standards. Thus, as a practical matter, Delaware case law is based on a large number of de cisions that have little stare decisis effect.
Although decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court are, of course, binding on the chancery court, the supreme court also appears ready to distinguish or overrule a precedent without regard to considerations of stare decisis. The absence of attention to stare decisis is partially a consequence of the fact-intensive nature of the court's decisions; the court can easily deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case specific facts to distinguish its prior holding. 122 Similarly the court can narrow the precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings narrowly and tying those holdings to specific facts. Yet even when the court overrules itself, it does so seemingly unconstrained by the considerations of stare decisis that commonly limit overruling. For example, when the court explicitly overturned several of its own precedents in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 123 the opinion made no reference to the doctrine of stare decisis. Instead, the court operates on the basis that it, like a legislature, can rewrite its prior doctrine based solely on a reassessment of the relevant policy considerations.
The unanimity norm of the Delaware Supreme Court further distinguishes the Delaware judiciary from that of other state courts. David Skeel explains that the norm also contributes to the instability of Delaware legal doctrine. As Skeel has observed, the Delaware Supreme 
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Court has an unusual tendency to issue unanimous decisions. 124 Skeel explains that the unanimity norm destabilizes Delaware law by masking the degree to which varying judicial preferences may lead to cycling from one doctrinal approach to another. Skeel demonstrates how the varying preferences of individual justices as to the appropriate legal approach in takeover cases may explain the doctrinal shift from TimeWarner to QVC.
125 In addition to departing from the decisionmaking process used by other states, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision making process, in which a single result masks conflicting or cycling lawmaking principles that are likely to animate future results, more closely resembles legislative decisionmaking.
Delaware judges also control their lawmaking agenda to an unusual degree.
126
Chris Peters explains that, as a general principle, judges cannot generally choose the legal issues that they wish to decide, but rather must wait for the appropriate case to present itself.
127 Legal rules announced by a court that are unnecessary to the result in a given case are disparagingly characterized as dicta.
128
Similarly, courts are constrained as to the temporal scope of their lawmaking. Recent Supreme Court precedent finds constitutional support for the principle that judicial lawmaking should be retroactive, and that it is improper for a court to announce a legal rule in a case and then fail to apply that legal rule to the parties before it.
129
Delaware courts seem unconstrained by these principles. They have repeatedly announced legal principles solely to guide future business decisionmaking.
130 Ron Gilson explains Chancellor Allen's practice of providing doctrinal guidance for future transactions through dicta.
131
Despite upholding the structure of a transaction or the decision of the board, Allen went out of his way on a number of occasions to point out 124 . See Skeel, supra note I 06. Skeel points to a number of factors that contribute to the unanimity norm, including an unusual Supreme Court rule that provides for an automatic en bane hearing in any case in which a justice dissents from a panel decision. 134 in the context of approving a settlement and despite concluding, at the outset of the opinion, that "there is a very low probability ... that the directors ofCaremark breached any duty to appropriately monitor and supervise the enterprise." 135 The fact that the description was dicta did not seem to affect its importance as an addition to Delaware law. The principles announced in Caremark have been among the most frequently cited by subsequent courts and commentators. 136 Delaware courts have also reached out to apply newly announced doctrines to cases seemingly outside the courts' reach . For example, concerned that stockholders would not anticipate its new rules governing appraisal rights and take the necessary steps to preserve their rights, the court in Weinberger announc ed that it would permit stockholders in a variety of ongoing transactions and lawsuits to retroactively claim the benefits of the new rule. 137 This decision was in clear contravention of the statutory limitations on the assertion of appraisal rights. The supreme court's action in vVeinberger was a departure from the lawmaking norm that judges lack the freedom to adjust the timing with which their newly announced legal rules take effect in order to reflect policy considerations.
138
In conclusion, Delaware courts are not structured like typical state courts and do not restrict themselves to traditional judicial lawmaking. Instead, Delaware courts aggressively adopt and modify corporate law doctrine, exhibiting a degree of activism that more closely resembles the legislative process. This resemblance is enhanced by the nature of l32. Gilson cites this practice with approval.
Such self-conscious a tlention to influencing the conduct o ffuturc tran sactions, indepe nd ent o f the case before the court, gives special meaning to the phrase "mere di cta." In the fast moving environment into which events thrust th e Court of Chancery, traditional common law accretion of precedent was too slow to help. The Chancellor's in strumcmal use of dic ta , directed exp licitly at transac tion planners, was a creati,·e a nd elegant response to the problem o f ke eping the law moving at a pace at least close to that of th e market.
Id. Z~t91 7 -1 8 . In this sec tion, this article evaluates the normative consequences ofDelaware's lawmaking. The article considers whether D elaware's approach to corporate lawmaking is likely to increase firm value, th ereby offering an efficiency-based explanation for D elaware 's ability to attract corporations. Alternatively, Delaware's lawmaking structure may, as suggested by Kamar, simply be a mechanism by which Delaware can maintain its position and increase its market power.
See In re
This article concludes that Delaware's unusual lawmaking structure enhances firm value and perhaps explains the widespread preference for Delaware incorporation. Delaware's lawmaking process is valuable in three ways. First, Delaware's indeterminate corporate law may have benefits as well as costs . Indeterminacy induces nego tiation and removes some incentives for strategic behavior. Indeterminate law also gives the courts greater flexibility. Second, D elaware's lawmaking is uniquely structured to maximize responsive ness to changing business developm ents. Finally by vesting a high degree oflegislative lawmaking power in a decisionmaker that is largely insulated from political pressure, Delaware reduces the potential for rent-seeking in connection with the lawmaking process.
A. 17ze Valu e qf Indete7minacy
Traditional analysis favors cl ear legal rules both because cl ear rules reduce information and litigation costs and because clear rules are viewed as more likely to induce primary behavior in compliance with those rules.
139 A legal system that relies on standards and muddy rules 140 increases uncertainty which, in turn, increases transaction costs. Accordingly, traditional analysis suggests that business is more efficiently conducted under a clear rule based system. Obviously this argument is overstated. A standard based approach can provide more realistic treatment of particularized facts. In cases in which factual distinctions are important, a rule based approach is likely to be unworkable.
141 A broadly written rule will prove overinclusive and discourage valuable transactions; a narrowly written rule will be underinclusive and easy to avoid through careful planning. For example, if one takes the view that management resistance to a hostile tender offer is sometimes desirable, it would be legislatively difficult to specify the circumstances under which such resistance is permissible. A muddy "reasonableness" standard reduces the difficulty of specification while preventing opportunism.
Standards thus increase lawmaking efficiency in two ways. Standards permit the lawmaker to tailor the result in a case and to thereby avoid the hardship or unfairness associated with application of a crystalline rule without destroying the applicable doctrinal structure.
142 Standards also create an affirmative role for the courts as gapfillers. 143 In the business context, the absence of a explicit prohibition may imply that a transaction is unrestricted although, as a practical matter, it may be impossible to predict and specifY the full range oflimitations on business decisionmaking. Private business contracts are similarly likely to contain gaps due to changing or unanticipated circumstances or the practical impossibility of complete specification. Standards allow the courts to fill 139. See, e.g., K.amar, supra note Commentators emphasize a standards based approach when they arc foc using on the fl exibility that standards provid e to decisionmakers. See id. Fo r purposes o f thi s article, the c hoice of termin o lo gy is unimportant, Delaware de cis ional law can accurately be described as bot h sta ndard based and muddy. 
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these gaps through ex post determinations. As Ian Ayres has observed, courts and the common law process are particularly well suited to this role.
144
Muddy rules may have particular utility in the business context because of their effect on the bargaining process. Ian Ayres and Eric Talley characterize muddy rules as an example of divided entitlements, in which each party has a probabilistic claim.
145 They then use game theory to demonstrate that muddy rules may facilitate bargaining. First, in the absence of the ability to predict a winner if the dispute results in litigation, the parties may be more willing to negotiate. Second, muddy rules can reduce the incentives to engage in strategic behavior by forcing parties to reveal information during negotiations.
146
Rules that encourage negotiation instead of litigation are especially valuable in corporate transactions, in which litigation costs can be large and create a deadweight loss for shareholders and society. Although D elaware law is often described as encouraging litigation, 147 a careful examination reveals that many Delaware cases settle early in the litigation process and that Delaware law both encourages and facilitates settlement.
148 Indeed, it is possible to explain some of the muddiness of Delaware case law as resulting from the procedural posture of the relevant judicial proceedings. Cases in which a court is considering a request for preliminary relief are apt to appear more indeterminate than cases in which the litigants have developed a complete factual and legal record.
149 Similarly, Delaware's pro-settlement orientation may cause courts to announce legal rules in the context of approving a settlement. 153 This limited role may result in rules that differ from those that would be announced in a different procedural context.
: Muddy rules also enable courts to engage in ex post tailoring of the legal structure to the particular factual context presented. The nature of the litigation process provides courts with information that gives them a comparative advantage over legislatures \Vith respect to this type of tailoring. Although legislatures may be better suited than courts at gathering information ex ante, they are less likely to see the ex post consequences of their chosen rules. Corporate law, in particular, because of th e essentially unlimited range of structural possibilities, may make ex ante specification difficult. Corporate lawmakers may be unable to determine the appropriate legal standards until they see a range of factual scenarios.
154
Muddy rules provide courts with the flexibility to respond to these scenerios.
The foregoing analysis does not mean that indeterminate corporate law is an unqualified good, merely that indeterminacy has benefits as well as the costs that have been identified by Kamar and others. 155 vVhether these benefits exceed the costs of indeterminacy to Delaware firms is an empirical question.
T he costs ofindeterminacy may, however, be overstated. 156 Although indeterminacy increases the risk of liability, the penalties for corporate decisionmakers who guess wrong are particularly limited. To the extent that legal rules arc; indeterminate, corporate officers and directors are able to engage in a broader range of conduct without acting in bad faith. So long as they act in good faith, corporate decisionmakers are unlikely to fa ce personal liability for their decisions. Indeed, good faith is typically the key to insuring their protection under statutory and charter limitations on personal liabiliti 57 and corporate indemnification 159 To the extent that a court's ex post application of a muddy rule results in injunctive relief, the injunction may simply have the effect of instructing the corporation as to the legal limits on its conduct. Thus, for example, if directors adopt a poison pill of questionable validity, the court's decision to strike it down is more informational than punitive, and the directors are unlikely to be worse off as a result of the decision than if they had decided not to adopt the pill in the first place.
B. The Value qf Responsiveness
At the recent Business Associations session of the Annual "tvieeting of The Association of American Law Schools, Ron Gilson observed that corporate law matters when the real world changes.
100 The evolution of Delaware case law reflects the truth of this observation. Delaware's law of fiduciary duties in the takeover context was the product of the frenzied takeover market of the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the extensive use ofjunk bond financing, public concern about the effect of corporate mergers on labor and community members, and the development by corporate management of a range of antitakeover devices. As the independent board of directors grew in importance, and shareholders began to rely on the independent board to monitor management decisionmaking, the Delaware courts responded by developing the scope of the duty of care and the circumstances under which the business judgment rule would protect board decisions. Recent controversies between large shareholders and management over the potential conflict bet\-veen shareholder voting power and management authority over corporate decisionmakingpresent questions such as the legality of the dead hand poison pill and the permissibility of shareholder rights bylaw amendments. 
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required to trigger the lawmaking process-the traditional common law process is slow. 162 The unique features ofDelawarejudiciallawmaking, including the activism of the courts and the limited role of stare decisis, allow Delaware to overcome this problem. Rather than considering themselves constrained by an evolutionary lawmaking process,
: 1
Delaware courts respond with the type of broad and aggressive lawmaking more commonly seen in legislatures and administrative agencies. 164 Procedural features of the Delaware courts enhance their responsiveness, including the courts' historic receptiveness to requests for expedited proceedings 165 and their willingness to issue rulings quickly in the context of a fast-paced business transaction.
166
The specialized caseload and the overall small size ofDelaware's dockets further add to the judiciary's ability to respond quickly.
167
Second, Delaware is able to respond in a preliminary fashion to initial developments , which enables it both to signal the potential legal response to the business community and to await the development of further information in response to that signal. The procedural context of many chancery court decisions, in which the court is ruling on a request for expedited relief, allows the court to provide tentative guidance about a fast-paced business development while awaiting a full factual record before committing itself. Similarly, the courts can use their standards based fiduciary principles to defer the development of bright line rules.
Delaware's analysis of dead hand poison pills illustrates this process. The first legal guidance on the subject was issued by the chancery court in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, lnc. 168 The court narrowly held, in the context of a motion to dismiss, that dead hand pills were subject to challenge both under th e Delaware statute and under fiduciary principles. Additionally, the court explicitly observed that it had no occasion to consider whether a pill of limited duration would present similar problems to the pill in the case at bar. 159 A subsequent Chancery Court decision, lvfentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design ~stems) Inc., 17 0 struck down a variation, a "no-hands" poison pill of limited duration, on narrow fiduciary duty grounds.
17 1 Finally, on the appeal of the A1entor Graphics decision, 172 the D elaware Supreme Court, working with the benefit of a full trial and an opportunity for appellate review, addressed the broader legal principle underlying both these decisions. The supreme court concluded that the pill 's restrictions on subsequentlyelected directors' ability to redeem the pill and sell the co mpany conflicted with the board's statutory power under Delaware section 14l(a).m With respect to many legal issues, the Delaware Supreme Court never provides such definitive resolution. Although appellate courts are generally viewed as playing a greater lawmaking role than trial courts, the exigencies of the business world, in many cases, force the chancery court to be the primary lawmaker. Thus, as Ron Gilson has explained, during the 1980s, the rapid transactional demands in the takeover market resulted in the resolution of many cases before they could be reviewed by the supreme court.
174 This caused the Chancery Court to be "the court of first and last resort for many takeover contests."
175
Third, Delaware courts anticipate the effect ofbusiness developments and try to develop responsive legal principles. Procedurally, as noted above, the Delaware courts structure the temporal reach of their decisions in a manner that extends beyond the case at bar. The courts seem to be deliberately designing rules for future business transactions. Indeed, as Doug Branson has observed, the Delaware courts selfconsciously instruct the business community as to future legal standards through lecturing tools such as roadmaps and dicta. 171. See ul. at 38 n.53 (explaining that, because the pill was invalidated on fiduciary duty grounds, it was unnecessa ry fo r the court to address alternative arguments that it was invalid). [Vol. 68 It is possible to understand the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkam 177 in this way. Van Gorkam generated a tremendous amount of controversy, even criticism, about the court's decision to subject the independent directors to personal liability for violating the duty of care.
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178 Yet the court's decision can be seen as an early signal of concern about the degree of oversight exercised by independent directors.
179
. Moreover this signal anticipated, by several years, recognition by the investment community of the ri sks posed by independent directors who do not devote sufficient attention to corporate decisions.
180
Finally, Delaware can fine-tune and even replace its preliminary attempts at regulation if further developments demonstrate that the initial rules are problematic. Both the standards based approach, which permits easy adjustment to new situations, and the other elements of Delaware's flexible use of precedent, allow it easily to adjust legal doctrine. As noted above, this flexibility is a function of the atypical nature of Delaware corporate decisional law and causes the chancery courts, in particular, to act something like administrative agencies.
181
The courts' developed corporate law expertise allows them to assess the impact of their decisions. The facility with which Delaware courts can change doctrine allows them to respond to their assessment that a prior approach was unworkable or reflected a poor policy judgment.
C. Political Advantages qf]udicial Lawmaking
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, Delaware relies heavily on its courts to develop principles of corporate law, and Delaware courts make law in an unusual way. Why is this structure advantageous to 177. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) .
I 78. See El so n , supra note 176, at676 n.52 (desc ribin g criticisms of co urt's decisio n).
179. This signal was not si lenced by the D elaware legislature' s adoption of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § l 02(b)(7 ). Although corporations are now statutorily auth otized lO eliminate some types o f director liability, the default rule still imposes liability, and no t every corporation o pts out of the default rule. See Ayres, supra no te 143, at 1412. Moreover, the statute docs not permit li ab ility to be eliminated fo r breaches of the duty of loyalty, acts in bad faith, or acll for whic h the director derive s an imprope r perso na! benefit. 
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Delaware corporations? This article has argued that Delaware is able to use its courts to fine-tun e its legal rules in response to business developments in a manner that is more difficult through the legislative process. It has also argued that the D elaware courts are highly respons1ve.
Other commentators have, however, emphasized the responsiveness of the Delaware legislature as one of the particul a r advantages of D elaware incorporation.'
'
2 M oreover, ifDelaware'sjudiciallawmaking rese mbles legislation, why not rely on the legislative process? This section argues th at Delaware's lawmaking structure offers advantages over the legislative process by providing superior access, reducing political influence, and increasing transparency. These attributes give D elaware's lawmaking structure comp arative advantages with respect to the development of corporate law principles.
Neil Komesar has done some of th e most extensive analysis of institutional competence and co mpara tive institutional advantage.
183
Komesar suggests that legislative and judicial lawmaking may each have strengths and weaknesses, but that careful analysis should consider the relative competence of each institution . In particular, legislatures may suffer from undue political influence , distortions due to rent-seeking, and the ability of well-organized interest groups to control the flow of information and, to some extent, the legislative agenda.
184 Courts in general, and the Delaware courts in particular, may be less susceptible to these weaknesses. Moreover, the particular dynamics of corporate litigation give courts specific advantages a,s lawmakers.
One obvious advantage of judicial lawmaking in the business area is that it is litigant driven. In essence, the business community has control over the lawmaking agenda to a degree that cannot be obtained through efforts at legislative influence. Legislators can simply refuse to respond to a lawmaking request, deciding that the transaction is too difficult to understand, that it is improper to cater to business interests by making more co rporate law rules, or that the interests of other constituencies have a more urgent claim on the lawmaking resources. Although the D elaware legislature has traditionally been very responsive to corporate requests for rulemaking, many other state legislatures have been less responsive, resulting in out-of-date and unworkable corporate statutes. 
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In contrast, business litigants can essentially force the court to evaluate the legality of a new type of transaction by bringing the issue to court. Komesar argues that the costs of participation represent an important consideration in comparing alternative lawmaking institutions.
186 He warns that courts are at a comparative disadvantage relative to the political process because of the variety ofbarriers to participation in the legal system, particularly in cases in which stakes are small and widely dispersed.
187
Komesar suggests that it is generally easier and less expensive for consumers and voters to register their preferences through the political process.
188
Particular attributes of corporate law suggest, however, that litigation may offe r advantages over the political process in terms of participant access to lawmaking. Many participants in corporate litigation are large corporations, the type of sophisticated, large stakes, participants for which the access barriers associated with adjudication are unlikely to pose a substantial burden.
189
Shareholders are the other major participants in corporate litigation. Komesar's analysis would seem more applicable to shareholders, but corporate litigation relies on a variety of substantive and procedural rules that affirmatively empower shareholders, increasing their access to the lawmaking process in a way that is not replicated in the political process. Mechanisms such as the shareholder derivative suit and the class action enable dissatisfied shareholders to challenge corporate decisionmaking. 1 g 0 Most importantly, the rules for shareholder litigation free individual shareholders from responsibility for funding the costs of litigation. A range of fee shifting structures enable courts to award attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs, allocate responsibility for fees to the corporation, or assess fees against the trial judgment or settlement proceeds.
191
By allowing entrepreneurial plaintiff's la·wyers to fund LJ. , Aug. 14, 1997, at 1 (describing the New York co rporate statute pri o r lO newly adopted amendments as "arcane" and "a deficient and innexible tool"). shareholder litigation, 192 these rules permit shareholders with limited funds to challenge corporations with substantial assets.
wloreover, the political process is poorly suited for participation by investors and competing business interests such as potential acquirers. Because of the structure of corporate law, only businesses resident in or incorporated in a state will have sufficient interest or ability to participate in the political process. Resident corporations can and do participate in the legislative process effectively, 193 but this participation is, for the most part, not possible for other affected groups. Shareholders invest in a variety of corporations that are not incorporated in their home state. Even if an investor's stake were sufficient to make participation in the political process rational, dispersed nonresident shareholders are unlikely to have any influence with the legislature in the state ofincorporation.
194 Given individual investors' relatively small stakes as well as the dispersion of corporate domiciles, investors are even less likely to attempt to buy political influence by making political contributions to out of state legislators. Out of state businesses may have larger stakes, but are similarly likely to lack political influence in a state in which they are not a resident. Moreover, even if political activism were viable, a potential acquirer is unlikely to be able to anticipate where a future target will be incorporated.
195 Accordingly, although the litigation playing field between corporate defendants and shareholder challengers may not be level, given that shareholder participation in the political process is likely to be nonexistent, shareholders clearly achieve greater voice through litigation.
In addition, various aspects of Delaware law facilitate shareholder access to the litigation process. Delaware imposes less onerous procedural burdens than many other states on shareholders seeking to initiate derivative suits. 
20
G The ability of politicians to extract funds from corporations creates the potential for legislators to extract rents through regulation. This focus on rent extraction , in addition to imposing substantial costs on political participants, can distort the ultimate choice of legal rules. 207 Indeed, although legislative lawmaking is sometimes defended as the product of more compl ete inform ation than that which is available to co urts,
B the interes t group dynamics in corporate iawmaking prese nt particular risks of distortion because in-state corpora tions, as th e only effecti ve political participants, can manipulate the information available to political decisionmake rs.
209
Judges obviously are not subj ect to the same types of direct political influence as legislators. 210 211 Both chancery and supreme court judges are appointed, based on a system of merit selection, for renewable twelve year terms, 21 2 thereby insulating the courts, to a large degree, from the political pressures that judges in other states may face. 213 Finally, the Delaware Constitution mandates balance between the two major political parties in appointment of Delaware judges .
14
These factors contribute to insulating Delaware judges relative to legislators from political influence.
A comparison ofDelaware's legislative and judicial lawmaking in the takeover area provides some support for the hypothesis that Delaware's judiciary is subject to less political influence than its legislature. The political process le ading to state adoption of anti takeover statutes has been widely analyzed.
5
Commentators have observed that state antitakeover legislation was widely adopted in response to local corporations seeking protection from hostile bidders.
2 16 As Romano explains, antitakeover statutes "are frequently pushed through the legislature at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of a hostile bid or apprehension that it will become a target."
217 Delaware was not exempt from this process; indeed the Delaware statute was the product of corporate influence and lobbying efforts. 218 The result of this political influence is legislation that uniformly favors the interests of corporate management. 219 Although state antitakeover statutes vary in the extent to which they limit the potential for a hostile takeover, in all cases, the statutes, including Delaware's antitakeover statute, make takeovers more difficult.
In contrast, courts have responded to takeover litigation with an attempt to balance deference to management decisionmaking with concern over shareholder treatment. 220 The result, in Delaware, is a series of decisions 221 that increase the degree of judicial scrutiny and heighten management obligations beyond the traditional business judgment rule analysis. 222 In other words, corporate management has been able to obtain more favorable takeover regulation in the legislature than in the courts. This outcome is likely the result of the greater opportunity for potential target corporations to influence lawmaking through the political process than through litigation.
Finally, judicial decisionmaking has the advantage of greater transparency than legislative lawmaking. The specific effects of corporate influence in politics are difficult to identify. Disclosure of corporate political spending is spotty and incomplete.
.Nlore importantly, the substantive arguments that corporations make to legislators through lobbying and political spending are made in private, with no forum for response or public debate. The political process thus creates a real possibility that legislators will not receive a balanced perspective or even hear both sides of an issue. 223 When legislators UNIVERSITY OF CINCINJVA Tl LAW REVIEvV [Vol. 68 decide to act, the legislative process provides a poor record of the basis for the legal rules that are enacted. Legislative history is incomplete and readily manipulated. 224 vVithout an indication of why legislators made their decisions, it is more difficult for critics to challenge the resulting laws.
Judicial lawmaking is far more transparent than legislative lawmaking. The adversary process provides a mechanism for presenting both sides of an issue to the decisionmaker. The litigation process itself is open to the public, and the pendency oflegal questions is a matter of public record . Even nonlitigants have the opportunity to ensure that the court has the benefit of full information on an issue by submitting amicus briefs. Finally, by making law through the process of issuing written opinions, judges provide the business community and the public with an explanation of the reasons for their decisions. 225 Because th e Chancery courts are courts of equity they sit without juries and maintain a tradition ofissuingwritten opinions. These practices distinguish them from trial courts in other states.
IV. THE ANALYSIS .APPLIED-INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM
Institutional activism provides a case study with which to apply the foregoing analysis and consider Delaware's ability to respond to changes in the business world. The activism of institutional investors represents a major and relatively recent business development. Institutions are becoming increasingly involved in corporate governance. 226 [Vol. 68 is likely to be strongly influenced by interest group dynamics. In particular, corporate management has an obvious stake in limiting the degree to which corporate law facilitates institutional activism. Moreover, institutions are unlikely to be effective counterweights to management's political influence. Institutions are poorly organized political actors, with little ability to lobby effec tively. 233 Their political weakness is evidenced by their relative impotence in connection with state adoption of anti takeover legislation.
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Additionally, responding to institutional activism is responding to a moving target. As institutions and issuers work through corporate governance issues, the nature of institutional activism has evolved, and this evolution is likely to continue.
23
+ Even a careful legislative assessment of the appropriate regulatory approach may rapidly become out of date as institutions become more sophisticated, more corrupt or more innovative in their activism.
Finally, clear rules that specify the appropriate degree of institutional involvement create incentive problems. Rules favoring management discretion can potentially frustrate institutional attempts to monitor and can eliminate any incentive on the part of corporate management to negotiate with institutions. Rules favoring institutions create the potential for excessive litigation and give institutions a tool that they can use strategically. Indeed, rules that broadly empower institutions can lead to rent-seeking and the extraction of private gains.
Delaware law takes a different approach. First, Delaware's muddy rules encourage institutions and management to bargain over governance changes rather than litigating or stonewalling. Second, judicial review of management responses to institutional activism conducted through the framework of fiduciary principles allows courts to oversee and respond to changes in the nature of institutional activism. Judicial review also allows courts to rebalance the legal structure in response to perceived overreaching on the part of either institutions or management. The flexibility provided by Delaware law enhances judicial power to prevent opportunism. This backdrop of judicial oversight may give the parties increased confidence to negotiate voluntarily. Finally, judicial lawmaking provides institutions ,\lith 233 . See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., TJu Folldorel!flnves!M CajJilalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1970 REv. , 1981 REv. ( 1997 ("Fragmented among tens of thousands of pension and mutual funds, and lacking the lobbying reso urces of corporate managements, institutional investors are anything but an ef1iciently organized political o r economic force. Coo rdination among them remains largely ad hoc and crisis-driven.").
234. 
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greater access to the lawmaking structure than they are likely to achieve in the legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
In analyzing regulatory competition in corporate law, commentators have focused on substantive law.
A comparative institutional perspective suggests, however, that a regulator can also provide advantages through its lawmaking process. Because of the inherent difficulty in evaluating substantive provisions of corporate law and in tracing incorporation decisions to differences bet:vveen states, 235 a process oriented approach offers the potential for new insights about the value of state competition.
Although it has received little attention, Delaware's corporate lawmaking process addresses systematic challenges in structuring corporate regulation. These challenges include the difficulty of assessing the impact of corporate rules on various corporate constituencies and the problems associated with designing rules that must function in a rapidly changing business environment. Delaware's equity courts are able to formulate flexible yet responsive legal principles that permit transactional evolution without increasing strategic behavior.
The manner in which Delaware courts maintain an aggressive lawmaking agenda, focus on articulation of principles to govern future standards, and freely adjust previously announced principles based on policy considerations, resembles the legislative process. At the same time, the standards based muddiness ofDelaware law retains a degree of ex post review for which courts are well suited. In addition, Delaware's extensive reliance on judicial lawmaking offers several advantages over the legislative process, including greater and more balanced access to the lawmaking process, increased political independence, and enhanced decisionmaking transparency. This article has argued that this lawmaking structure is particularly appropriate in corporate law.
In conclusion, the peculiar role of the Delaware courts may provide greater explanatory power for Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters than previously identified theories. Delaware has developed a unique corporate lawmaking structure and process. If, as this article
